INTRODUCTION

BY

VISCOUNT HALDANE

I HAVE ventured to ask the authoress of what Professor Bosanquet has recently called “the most sane and brilliant of recent works on political theory,” to let me write a few pages introductory to the next issue of her book. My reason has been, not the thought of being able to improve on anything that she has said in it, but the desire to help to make the book known in my own country by pointing out its bearing on our own political problems. For to me the book is one of real importance. It is the exposition of a principle which is not stated for the first time, but which, in the form and connection in which she states it, seems to place many difficulties in a new light, and to lay to rest controversies, some at least of which have arisen out of misinterpretation of what is fundamental. Vagueness about first principles is at once the source of confusion in conception and of waste of valuable energy. Now Miss Follett’s book sets itself firmly to avoid this vagueness.

“The New State” has a double purpose. It seeks to establish a point of view from which self-production and variation in the forms of the State may be rendered intelligible, and it endeavours to show the lines on which these forms may be adapted in the solution of practical questions. The relations of Labour to Capital are becoming progressively difficult as the labouring classes are advancing in education and ability for searching reflection. The questions which are every day arising cannot be wholly separated from their theoretical basis. This basis is being discussed everywhere, sometimes crudely, but more and more with insight and knowledge. The authoress has therefore undertaken to examine and restate it, and she does so with a learning and grasp which it
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would be difficult to surpass. There are few fields of research which she has not explored.

About the theory that underlies the book I propose to write very briefly, its importance notwithstanding. For what is most to the point to-day is that, as illustrated in their application to politics, a set of practicable ideas, in vital respects not only fresh but full of promise, are set forth for consideration.

I will therefore refer to Miss Follett’s philosophical views only in so far as is necessary to make my interpretation of the practical side of the book intelligible. The great point in her theory is that the controversy between Monism and Pluralism arises out of views that are too contracted on both sides. Monism is often thought to suggest that the state is a self-subsisting entity into which all sovereign power is really gathered up and is exercised outside the central government only by permission or delegation. Such a conception the pluralists naturally find to be too narrow to contain the facts. They pronounce it to be not only ethically objectionable, but incapable of explaining our actual experience of legislation and administration alike. Hobbes’ “Leviathan” and the German notion of the state they put on the same level. The most acute among the critics of the monistic state are careful not to fall into the journalistic habit of representing the late German Government as the outcome of idealist metaphysics. They know too much not to be aware that the great theorists of a hundred years ago in Germany did not wish for anything of the kind. It was not Hegelianism, as Miss Follett and the best-informed thinkers have come to understand it, but the violent reaction against idealism which set in throughout Germany soon after Hegel’s death, that gave rise to the dominance of militarism.

Hegel does not appear to have been a particularly pleasant person in controversy. He indulged at times in diatribes against his opponents, and he has paid the usual penalty of being miscalled and misrepresented. But had he lived in Boston in 1920, instead of in Germany a century earlier, he would probably, as far as I can judge from his writings, have said something not very different from what Miss Follett says.

His concern was to explain the existing state of things in his own country and in Great Britain, the constitution of which was for him a subject of keen interest. For Hegel, as for others, it was only after the day’s work had been done that philosophy could come on the scene to survey it. The American Constitution would for him have been an actual fact, embodying what he pronounced, in his Philosophy of Right, to be “freedom of individual thought, the principle of the modern world that all essential aspects of the spiritual whole should attain to their rights by self-development.” “From this standpoint,” he says, “one can hardly raise the idle question as to which form is the better, monarchy or democracy.” We venture to reply simply that the forms of all constitutions of the state are one-sided, if they are not able to contain the principle of free individuality, and do not know how to correspond to completed reason. He denounces “the confusion of the force of right with the right of force.” It was he who said of Napoleon that he had brought “the highest genius to victory, only to show how little victory could achieve.” He was a conservative, but in the first place he was a thinker. He knew that the forms of government might display infinite variety, according to the moods of those who were behind them. And therefore, when he had been carrying the proof sheets of a book to the printers in Jena, and had been passed by Napoleon who was entering the town at the head of his troops, he made the dry observation in a letter, that he had met the World Spirit and that it was on horseback.

I have referred to Hegel’s teaching only because Miss Follett refers to it in much the same sense. His task was simply to take the facts as he found them and to discover what was their meaning. As the result he held that human institutions belonged to the region, not of inert externality, but of mind and purpose, and were, therefore, dynamic and self-developing. Miss Follett’s principle is not different. She would fain avoid the approach to metaphysical discussion. Like Mr. Bosanquet she finds in the obvious facts of social experience the ground on which she seeks to build up her structure. The cardinal doctrine of her book is that the state is what its members make
it to be. Sovereignty is a relative notion. The individual is sovereign over himself in so far as he can develop, control and unify his manifold nature. The group is sovereign in so far as its members in unity direct themselves in the expression of the common purposes they are evolving. A state is sovereign only in so far as it does the same thing, and it gives rise to the power of a great group unified by common ends. It is the expression of elements of identity in purpose. We are not isolated atoms. We live and we think only in communion with others of our kind, and it is so that we evolve the collective will which, in its fullest and most imperative form, gives rise as its outcome to sovereignty. This will is not a mere aggregate of isolated wills. It evolves itself only through living with others in group life, out of actual identity of ideas and purposes amid their differences. The form of the state and the meaning of the resulting sovereignty may vary, following general opinion at different periods and under different conditions, and so may the mode of expressing the imperative. But all ultimately comes back to the will of the people of the state. It was this will, as he interpreted it, that Cromwell expressed when he beheaded Charles the First. It was this will that was embodied when the British people first succeeded in laying down definite constitutional limitations on the power of their kings. It was this will that Lincoln proved to have expressed when he placed beyond doubt the unity of the nation as a nation in the American Civil War.

It is not true that each group within the state has an isolated sovereignty. Each group may control itself, but only within the limits of its existence and influence as a group. It is like the individual, with a general will which is distinctive, but a will the purposes of which fall within the larger purposes of the state group. Wills are not atomic. They may and do act under the guidance of various ends, some of which are less individual than others. The general will so evolved is no entity separate from these individual wills. It is their common expression. But it may, as in war time, present these individual wills as unified at a tremendous level. Reality does not always exist at the same level, and human purposes may embody reality at varying degrees. The will is no static thing but is a form of the dynamic activity characteristic of mind. At some of these degrees each may stand for the whole, and when this is so the private mind coincides with the group mind. Thus there is no isolated sovereignty, nor does the unified state begin from any pre-existing unity in its control of its groups. It may be evolved only gradually, or it may be that on occasions the individual wills effect their unification per saltum. History contains examples of both methods. There are many forms in which sovereignty is given shape, just as there are many forms of the state. In Great Britain the instrument of the unified state is, in principle at all events, Parliament. In America it is the Federal and State Governments and their Executives, with that Supreme Court, the delegation to which of some degree of sovereign power under the original Constitution the genius of John Marshall brought to clear light when he rendered judgment in Marbury v. Madison. Such a judgment as his would not have been rendered in England. But then the written constitution of the United States is an instrument differing radically from that of Great Britain. There sovereign power is differently distributed. Yet in both countries the ultima ratio is the collective will of the people.

Sovereignty is thus a fact with many forms, and not an abstract or uniform principle. It is a consequence of the existence of the state rather than the state itself. Whoever can gain the approval of the people gets this power. Sovereignty in the subordinate group is not different in nature from state sovereignty, but it is only relative sovereignty, and it is subordinate to that of a larger entirety. As I have said, the individual man is no static or isolated atom. Relations to his fellow men are of the essence of his life, and they are ever in active process of development. He is always to some extent engaged in developing these relations. And so it is with the subordinate groups. They are always seeking to bring themselves into relation with each other, it may be in a trade-union congress or it may be in a different kind of association for the promotion of some common cause. All
these groups may be of great value. Ideally all are essential, for the functions which mankind has to fulfil are not activities in isolation from each other. It would be to the good if the teacher could always have the practical training of a parent. Man must identify himself, so far as he can, with the experience of humanity generally. But we are finite and must limit our purposes if we would accomplish anything actual. What pluralism really has to impress is that a rich experience cannot be adequately gained excepting through many actual relations in group life. What it is apt to overlook is that none of these group relationships is more than a stage towards a more complete whole within which they all take their places, and that consequently, even as a citizen, man has to identify himself with group life in many forms before he has fully developed his humanity. In some of such groups I may be an employer; in others an employee. I may be a workman and also a shareholder; a clerk, and the representative of my fellow citizens on a local authority; a lawyer and a fellow of a college or a professor. I may thus not only get education in opposing points of view, but I may contribute to apparently opposing points of view. Only apparently opposing, however, because there is a larger outlook which is open to me, from which they fall into their places. It is through this larger outlook that what is called a true general will develops itself.

Individuals and groups stand in no antithesis. The group will is just the individual will at a different level of purpose. The sovereign state itself is nothing apart from the citizens who compose it, and whose assent to its objects and its organisation it embodies. The hesitation in accepting this view has arisen from the idea that individual human beings exist only as segregated atoms, with purposes which are entities apart and merely resembling each other. But our experience tells us that such is not the true character of mind, and the state, like the subordinate group, is the embodiment of mind. We cannot obtain our full stature or even be what we are apart from active relationships, to our parents, or to our churches, or to our social and political surroundings. When I pay my rates and taxes I accept this as a fact. No one group can completely enfold me, and that is because of the multiplicity of my nature. Nor can any number of groups exhaust the capacity of the modern citizen. Group organisation is a method or instrument in politics, but the ultimate unit is always the individual, because his activities and range are more extensive than those of any group organised only for special purposes and in this sense subordinate to his full life by reason of the limitation of its purposes. Beyond the ends by which the group is thus confined lie the wide purposes of the nation state. This state is no Absolute. For it too may participate in movements which go beyond itself, and concern no one people but mankind generally. That is the principle of a League of Nations or a Concert of Powers, or whatever else the form of union may be. But here too there is no contradiction between the will of the member and that of the community. The will of the latter is just that of the former at a higher level or degree and in a different aspect, a result depending not on mechanical addition, but on identity in modes of thought and the action which embodies it. These are not separable. Majority rule must if it is to be of value, possess an intellectual foundation of a character different from what is merely mechanical addition.

It is our habit of assuming that we are dealing with aggregates of mechanical and exclusive things, standing in no higher relationship than that of causes and effects external to one another, that has caused confusion. The tendency to assume that the category appropriate to things or substances is sufficient for the representation of all phases of our experience of the actual, has been responsible for the genesis of this habit. Miss Follett's task has been to bring unconscious assumptions of this kind to light and to scrutiny, and this she has sought to do simply by testing them against the facts of life and their background.

For her the true state does not demand a merely submissive allegiance, for it is the outcome of a spontaneous and instinctive process of unifying manifold interests. Nor need it in its activities supersede those of subordinate groups, such as trade unions, whose functions are different from its own, while
they can yet be fitted into their places in a larger entirety. Every legitimate interest can not only be recognised but can be regarded with satisfaction. If I am discontented with the policy of the state I can seek to change it. For I am a member of the whole with a title to an integral function and voice in it. No abstract principle can be laid down for the solution of situations in which dissatisfaction arises. For the facts are usually highly individual. And the state is no static unit. For it is not an arbitrary creation; “It is a process; a continual self-modification to express its different stages of growth in which each and all must be so flexible that continual change of form is twin-fellow of continual growth.” The stability of the state depends on continuity of broad national purpose, and, consistently with that continuity and the stability resulting from it, there is room for infinite modification in internal institutions. The state is made, not by external acts, but by the continuous thought and action of the people who live its life. In this sense it is never perfect for it is a process that remains always unbroken in creative activity.

The practical lesson of all this may be expressed in Miss Follett’s own words: — "Neighbourhood education and neighbourhood organisation is then the pressing problem of 1918. All those who are looking towards a real democracy, not the pretence of one which we have now, feel that the most imminent of our needs is the awakening and invigorating, the educating and organising of the local unit. All those who in the humblest way, in settlement or community centre, are working for this, are working at the greatest political problem of the twentieth century.” Knowledge is from this point of view indeed power, and here is a method for systematically acquiring and imparting the knowledge requisite for political life. She concludes a chapter on this subject in fervent words: — "This is the way we must understand an individual allegiance. I live for ever the individual life. As an individual I am the undivided one, as the group-I, I am again the undivided one, as the state-I, I am the undivided one — I am always and for ever the undivided one, mounting from height to height, always mounting, always the whole of me mounting.”

“The great lesson of the group process,” says Miss Follett towards the end of the book, “is that particularism, however magnified, is no longer possible. There is no magic by which selfishness becomes patriotism the moment we can invoke the nation. The change must be this: as we now see that a nation cannot be healthy and virile if it is merely protecting the rights of its members, so we must see that we can have no sound condition of world affairs merely by the protection of each individual nation — that is the old theory of individual rights. Each nation must play its part in some larger whole. Nations have fought for national rights.” “What raises this war to a plane never reached by any war before is that the Allies are not fighting for national rights. As long as history is read the contribution of America to the Great War will be told as America’s taking her stand squarely and responsibly on the position that national particularism was in 1917 dead.”

If I read aright the record of the constitutional issues which are to-day being discussed throughout the United States, this remains profoundly true. That a great nation should examine these questions critically and in detail seems to me as natural as it is necessary, and in no sense to be in conflict with the full recognition of the principle that her people have definitely taken their stand on what goes beyond national particularism. It is by the fullest and freest discussion and debate, and by this means alone, that a true national purpose can be evolved and brought to clarity and full fruition.

I now pass to the second object with which “The New State” is written. It is to show how, the state being non-mechanical and capable of self-development, its self-development can be best accomplished. The answer of the authoress is that the question is ultimately one of education in the largest sense. She does not deal with education as a general subject. She confines herself to the capacity which the individual, with the ability for a larger life as a citizen in the state about which she writes, can make that life actual. How is democracy to be improved? How are we to reach something with a deeper significance than a majority obtained in the ballot boxes by mere mechanical and narrow party organisation? To this her
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The answer is that no government will be really successful or endure which does not rest on the individual on his better side, and that this better side is to be reached neither by sending more people to the poll nor by sending them there more frequently. For to do so is to effect no real deliverance from particularism, nor is genuine union to be got by simply collecting a crowd. It is only by a sufficiency of intelligent discussion and by the evolution of common purpose in diverse forms of group life that the capacity of the individual citizen can be called forth. That individual is always potentially more than he knows himself to be. He is no passive element in an assemblage. He can create, and this he does best when joining with others to form a real whole of opinion and action, a living group, in which he can develop his personality. The first need of democracy is therefore training for citizenship, which must be trained for as we train to develop other capacities.

It appears that in the United States a beginning has been made in the organisation of the group training which is thus requisite. As there are many relations in which men stand to each other, so training in more than one form of association is necessary. In a particular town there may be a group, with a character resembling the Whitley Council in Great Britain, in which employers and workmen voluntarily meet and discuss the conditions of industrial life. Injustice and imagined injustice are equally found in the majority of cases to have resulted from want of knowledge and not from evil purpose. A common general opinion is developed which tends to settle such disputes as remain, and capital and labour may thus come to understand and interpret aright each other’s claims. The sense of a set of common functions in industry can so grow.

Next door to the industrial group and in the same town there may be a health group. As I write I have before me the papers relating to an organisation of this kind in Cincinnati. We are familiar with something of the same sort in my own country. Our health committees are organised for the same end, and they are partially recognised by the State and by the Local Authorities, and receive some assistance. But the movement is still in its infancy, and it has not so far been practicable to put it adequately on a democratic basis, instead of trusting to the energies of individuals to run it.

In Cincinnati, where the name used for the group is “social unit,” this is defined as being “a group of people living in the same neighbourhood, and organised to give and receive community service.” The plan of work goes on to state that “the same principle of group organisation will be applied to the social work, the nursing, the statistical work, etc., as well as to the gradual building up of an advisory council composed of men and women from other occupational groups in the community. For example, in social work, formulation of plans and directions of policies will rest in city committees of social experts, elected by their fellow-members and united through their heads in a social council, of which the Superintendent of Public Welfare will be a member. . . . In summary the unit plan aims at three things: to organise the people of a limited district democratically, so that they can get a clear idea of what their common needs are, and what they think ought to be done about them; to organise democratically the specialists of the neighbourhood and of the city so that the highest skill and experience can be applied to meeting the needs disclosed, and to bind the people and the technically skilled groups together in such a way that the people can tell the specialists what they want done; and the specialists can point out how to do it, submitting plans, programmes, and policies to the people for their approval. To put it another way, the plan is an attempt to bring efficiency to democracy.”

This is an illustration of the principle set forth in “The New State” for the building up of an enlightened general opinion, a principle which is meant, however, to have a far wider application than it has as yet obtained in Cincinnati and the other cities which have partially applied it. In particular the principle is capable of application to the relations between Labour and Capital. The British Whitley Council plan is capable of great extension. So soon as employers learn that their workmen are now insisting on having a voice as to the conditions under which they work, and that this does not mean interference with expert direction of higher policy, progress of this
kind may become rapid. Such progress has already begun to show itself, both in the United States and in Great Britain. There is indeed a broad political and economic question raised. There is a growing sense that those who do constructive work, whether as hand workers or as brain workers, should no longer be wholly under the domination of those whose sole aim is to make money. The true purpose of industry is being felt by an increasing number to be the provision, not so much of mere dividends, as of service from which the community as a whole may derive benefit. The function of capital is becoming recognised to be that of a means rather than that of an end; to assist and to develop the labour of human beings, rather than to use human beings to serve it. Economic activity should always be carried on consistently with the greatest social purposes, and its rewards should be, as far as possible, rewards for real service rendered whether by hand or by brain.

It is this conception of the duty and station of the members of the state that is becoming more and more prominent in both the New World and the Old. It is the outcome of increasing reflective power in the working classes, and its neglect in the past has been the most fertile of the sources of industrial unrest. Mere profit-sharing does not suffice to-day. The desire is for the status of free men, co-operating in the discharge of a general obligation. An individual is not the less free because he must work hard. But his freedom in his toil consists in this, that he knows why he toils and that he does so as a member of his community. If he has the sense that he does what he does as what he owes to himself, and not merely to another who can compel him, the best kind of man will not only work hard but he will work willingly. He does not even ask that he should have the same share as others more fortunate in this respect. What he wishes to feel is that he is a free citizen and respected as such. Poor and rich are alike in this quality, more than those who come in contact with only one or the other are apt to suppose. The gloom which basises itself on the supposed absence of justice is carried too far. Those who talk so forget that it is not by bread alone that man wishes to live. Whether the duties which are allocated are those of the physical toiler or of the brain worker, the best of all look for their reward in a sense gained which is of a spiritual character. There is a fine passage in the second series of Mr. Bosanquet’s Gifford Lectures,¹ which points to the deeper-lying principle on which this conclusion rests. “If we are arranging any system or enterprise of a really intimate character for persons closely united in mind and thoroughly penetrated with the spirit of the whole — persons not at arm’s length to one another — all the presumptions of individualistic justice at once fall to the ground. We do not give the ‘best’ man the most comfort, the easiest task, or even, so far as the conduct of the enterprise is concerned, the highest reward. We give him the greatest responsibility, the severest toil and hazard, the most continuous and exacting toil and self-sacrifice. It is true and inevitable, for the reasons we have pointed out as affecting all finite life, that in a certain way and degree honour and material reward do follow on merit in this world. They follow, we may say, mostly wrong; but the world, in its rough working, by its own rough and ready standards, thinks it necessary to attempt to appraise the finite individual unit; this is, in fact, the individualistic justice, which, when we find it shattered and despised by the Universe, calls out the pessimism we are discussing. But the more intimate and spiritual is the enterprise, the more does the true honour and reward restrict itself to what lives —

¹ In those pure eyes
And perfect witness of all-judging Love.

Under an order of things that has now passed away it was easier to find room for freedom in this attitude than it is in our time. Production on an enormous scale, the use of machinery at every turn, and the magnitude of output, have all tended to separate capital from labour, and to create rival organisations with uniform and monotonous work for the individual worker, especially in the case of labour. We have moved away from the state of things in which the workman began and carried to its completion the production of each

¹ The Value and Destiny of the Individual, p. 153.
particular article. It was inevitable that it should be so. But with the change his pride of paternity is gone. His piece of work is no longer his own, in idea and execution, as it was in the old days. It is more difficult for him to feel that his activity is directed to an end complete in itself, in which quality can count. His service is to-day much more directed to an end that does not appeal to him, contributing merely one particle to a huge aggregate in which its character, and his own intellect, is lost out of sight. We have consequently a far more difficult problem to deal with when we endeavour to make his sense of self-respect keep pace with his growing enlightenment on the question of what his life ought to be.

Change of a considerable kind in the general organisation which prevails to-day appears to be slowly becoming unavoidable, if industrial and social unrest is not to increase with that increasing spread of knowledge which is inevitable and is already in progress and which all right-minded people must welcome. Democracy will doubtless solve this problem for itself, the only way in which it can be really solved, and the practical question is whether this is to be done by sudden and violent effort, such as is being called for by the impatient, or by methods that are progressive and gradual in their unhasting yet unresting gentleness, yet not on that account the less efficient. If the latter alternative is to become the order of the day there is something else required than simple organisation of the democracy. This further requisite is indicated, if not dwelt on in detail, in Miss Follett's book. I am not sure that in what I am going to refer to we are not, on this side of the Atlantic, at least as far on in our commencement of the solution of the further problem as are the people of the United States. But it is evident that both peoples are becoming conscious of a new social question, if slowly, yet profoundly.

What I refer to is the necessity of education in a larger meaning of the word. Education is looked on popularly as a dull topic. So it is in some of its aspects, but only if the sense of the word is unduly confined. The name does not signify merely what we are familiar with in the training of youth. That is a most important national concern, but it does not occupy all the ground. Its purpose is, by instruction given to those who have not yet developed full freedom or full personality, to inculcate what is required for such development. Consequently the position of the teacher has to be one of authority. What he lays down must in the main be accepted as the truth. It, therefore, implies a standard in the main external to the mind which is confronted with it. It is assumed that a defined result, rather than the method of attaining it, or the spirit of the search after it, is what matters.

Now in the case of the University student of the higher type this is different. He comes with a good deal of knowledge, normally gained in the secondary school, and with considerable experience of life. He is already to a considerable extent an educated adult. What he comes for is to receive a new inspiration. His professor does not stand over him in a relationship of external authority. Student and teacher are comrades on a journey of discovery on which both recognise that there is no finality, and that what signifies is not a body of rigid and complete truth, for there is none such, but the search after truth, and the expansion and freedom of spirit which such search gives. The relationship at this later stage, where the education is that of the adult, is a fresh one, and it presupposes a considerable amount of mental and spiritual experience as already possessed by the student. But such teaching has a creative effect. It brings to birth in the best student a new discovery of how much he can become that he is not yet. He has a nascent sense of a freedom that he did not before possess, and his outlook on life becomes enlarged in a new fashion. The best in literature, in science, in philosophy, in art, in public life, and in religion, is now fully opened to him, and he can commune with the great souls that have expressed themselves throughout history as though they were his living teachers. The importance of his new gift is one that is difficult to exaggerate. He is an individual who takes his place in the whole that society constitutes with enlarged relations and capacities for good.

The problem which is occupying some of us in Great Britain is how to extend the range of such training, and the enlarge-
ment of the spirit which follows on it, to the working classes. We now think that this has been demonstrated to be possible. If it is possible, then there lies in front a new avenue towards a state of society in which unrest will be, not abolished, but converted into a discontent of a new order, the discontent of the individual with limitations for which he himself, and not circumstances, will have the responsibility. For the really educated man works himself out of adverse conditions. He and his educated neighbours combine in a rational fashion to re-fashion general opinion and the conditions which are there just because general opinion has let them be there.

Let us therefore give to the working classes as freely as can be of the water of this priceless fountain. They are just like the rest of society, and are inspired by the same ideals. The point is how to make the highest ideals prominent and to develop these among them. For it is the most spiritual that is the most real and most compelling, with them as with us.

I have seen a good deal of the Labour movement over here. I have intimate and valued friends among its leaders. I have addressed a good many Labour meetings. And this has struck me. Those who assemble in them think just as the rest of us do. They feel keenly when they are excluded from what is best, but their desire is to live along with us the lives of good citizens if we will only let them. Good citizens they cannot fully become while we deny them the higher blessings of citizenship. It is this denial that gives rise to violent language. The agitations for nationalisation, for better housing, for higher wages, for shorter hours of work, are just the expressions of the real demand which if larger is gentler. If we can give them the full education they desire, then a larger and more enlightened society at a more uniform level will put these things right. Service to others will be more evenly rewarded, and the conditions of life will gradually become more nearly equalised. There will be in any case reasonable hope for the attainment of such a result. The methods to-day prescribed for attaining the ends which Labour sets before itself will gradually be superseded, as the ends to which they have been directed become attained. Capital will no longer dominate.

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It will still be there but as progressively being endowed with a new function in the interests of society, and its owners will be rewarded, not merely for the accident of possession, but on the basis of what they do for those in conjunction with whom they work. The great organiser may continue to be paid a great wage, for his service may be as irrereplaceable as it is priceless. But when it is so it will be in accordance with general assent to its being so. Individual talent must command individual reward. Even Bolshevikist Russia appears to have now discovered this. Probably nine industries out of ten will be found to be so dependent on this talent as to be incapable of anything like nationalisation, notwithstanding the fact that there are conditions which must be observed in the general interest. Yet there may remain other industries which can be and ought to be national, just as navies and postal services are. They may require a new and very high class of state servants to be trained for their management for the public, men whose position must be made to correspond with the sense of duty to the state required of them. But there should be available in the provision of such service a new and as yet untapped reservoir of democratic talent to draw on, which so far has not yet been constructed.

I am impressed, so far as my observation has gone, with the moderation of the working classes when they are taken into counsel and trusted, even when they are suffering under hardships which they hold to be preventable. The loud and discordant voices, whether expressed at meetings or in print, turn out to represent those of a minority. The majority desire far-reaching reform, but they would rather have it quietly, and so avoid the risk of confusion and consequent failure. The way to meet them seems to be to act on the principle on which the Reform Bill was conceded over here in 1832, and in which the demands of the Chartists were gradually met a little later on. This principle was that of the Whigs, a body of men who were very shrewd, even where they do not seem to us to have been very intelligent according to the standards of our time. It was by their resolute refusal to bolt and bar doors that the application of the battering ram was avoided. They were
always ready to discuss things on the assumption that the political truth to which they had been accustomed could never have been more than relative truth. Nothing stands still in political thought, any more than in thought of other kinds.

But I have not referred to these things in order to speculate on the future of political institutions. About these there will be many varieties of opinion and much divergence of method. What I am insisting on is the principle of relativity in political thought, and that its co-ordinates of reference are ever varying. It is with the hope of getting a larger outlook, the result of a more intelligent public opinion, that I am suggesting here the advisability of a great and systematic stimulation of the self-education of the adult working-class population, and I will, before concluding, draw attention very briefly to how we are attempting in my own country to initiate this stimulation.\footnote{For fuller information on this subject see "University Tutorial Classes; a Study in the Development of Higher Education among Working Men and Women" by Albert Mansbridge (1913), and The Report to the Government of the Master of Balliol's Committee on Adult Education in 1919 (Cmd. 321), as well as, from the point of view of Labour, "The Education of the Citizen," by Arthur Greenwood.}

The adult son or daughter of the well-to-do citizen can only be adequately educated further in a university atmosphere, and so also the working people can only receive adequately the stimulus of education of the same kind through the personality of a first-rate university teacher. Personality counts for much in this connection. The universities must therefore be primarily entrusted with this new mission. They must be encouraged to train teachers of a quality as high as that of their best tutors for their industrial purposes, who will devote themselves to this new and extra-mural work. For the class of teacher of this kind a profession is thus opened as real as that of the clergymen whom the old universities over here used to train in such large numbers. It is an attractive mission. The tutor may go for three or four years' work among the new class of students, and ought then to return within the walls of his university for study and research, so that he may return to his work refreshed. The cost to the state is small, and already some provision has been made here for a new communal service which promises to have a most valuable future. Oxford has been particularly active in the movement.

In his book on "Nationality and Government" Mr. A. E. Zimmerm, after defining education as, not simply experience, but experience interpreted, goes on, in the chapter on Education, social and national, to say this: "Few parts of Industrial England can appear more depressing at first sight to the casual visitor than the string of overlapping villages now comprised in the new County Borough of Stoke-on-Trent and known as the Five Towns. Smoke and slag-heaps have done their best to mar the appearance of a once beautiful countryside; nor have the towns themselves yet been able to do much to remedy the confusion and ugliness inseparable from nineteenth-century industrialism.

"Yet, a few weeks ago, addressing an audience of miners in a village schoolroom on one of the ridges overlooking this vale of smoke, a distinguished student of Sixteenth Century England spoke of what he termed the revival of humanism in the England of to-day. 'Early in the sixteenth century,' he said, 'a great educational movement arose in Europe and penetrated to England. Men felt that new worlds were opening up before their eyes, that there were great kingdoms of the mind to be overrun and possessed. In those days there was a great Dutch scholar named Erasmus. He came to England to meet his fellow scholars. He went to the seats of knowledge, to Oxford and to Cambridge, where the new learning was at home. If Erasmus were to come to England on such a mission to-day, do you know,' he asked the miners, 'where he would be directed to come? He would be taken to the Potteries.' The miners looked surprised. Some of them had been in the pit all day; others were going down on the night shift; but that so much importance should be attached to their natural human desire to meet at regular intervals for an evening's tuition at economics seemed strange to them. Their tutor, for whom the regular five miles' missionary journey up the hill at the end of his own day's work was more of a strain than
he let them know, was, however, glad to feel that his work
linked him with the great scholars of the past."

This kind of extra-mural university teaching is to-day
being given by most of our universities and in different parts
of the country. There is no restriction on the number or char-
acter of the subjects. What is offered consists not in disjointed
lectures but in systematic courses, on which is built the en-
couragement of investigation by the students themselves, dis-
tributed into groups for the purpose. Philosophy, Economics,
History, Literature, Art, Music, Science, all have their places,
and care is taken to avoid prejudice on the part of the men due
to the exclusion of particular standpoints. Discussion is
therefore trusted for bringing out the relative merits of doc-
trines. Each class, consisting of about twenty-five, lasts for
about two hours, the first of which is occupied with exposition,
and the second with the discussions to which the workmen
attach much importance.

What I have sketched represents the best form of what is
actually taking place. The system has been organised in a
fair number of places by the various universities. But it is
still in its infancy, and some of us will not be satisfied until
it has spread all over our country, while at least maintaining
its level and quality. It is for the state to give it recognition
as of an importance as great as that of the education of the
youth of the nation. For an educated democracy would gradu-
ally become a democracy inspired as the people of to-day are
not yet inspired. Its capacity for the estimation of values
would be heightened, and so would be its power of judging
about the means to its ends. It is fuller knowledge alone
that can be trusted to make a people conscious of the immensi-
ties of the difficulties of self-government,

"And apprise it if pursuing
Or the right way or the wrong way
To its triumph or undoing."

It is also such knowledge alone that can render it fully
aware of "the little done; the undone vast," and awaken in it
that "divine discontent" which the spectacle of unrealised
standards around must awaken before a remedy is practicable.

A great educational change of this kind, if made throughout
a country, ought to tend to change the temper, not merely of
the working classes, but of the whole community, and to
change it for the better. It is from ignorance that the bulk
of injustice springs, and knowledge treats injustice gently
because it has latent in it a spiritual power of getting rid of it.
Such knowledge cannot but double the efficacy of Miss
Follett's principle of group organisation. Indeed it is hardly
separable from it, and she herself treats the matter as itself
falling within the domain of national education.

It is to the self-organisation of the citizens of the state in
groups formed for the several purposes of social life that some
of us are coming to look more and more in the interests of
democracy in the future. The individual citizens dare not,
if the organisation is to be a reality, allow their intellectual
and spiritual education to stand still after any period of life.
The striving for the larger outlook resulting from fuller knowl-
dge, if it is encouraged in childhood, must not be allowed to
cease before the end of life. As Goethe makes Faust in his
last days declare,

"He only gains and keeps his life and freedom
Who daily strives to conquer them anew."

In reform there is finality no more than there is in truth in
general, of which reform is only an example. It is in the qual-
ity reached in the striving itself, and not in a result, apparently
but not really to be attained once for all, that we may profit-
ably seek to satisfy our desire for the sense of something ac-
complished.

If I have interpreted her book aright this appears to me to
be an inference to be drawn from Miss Follett's results. But
whether or not she would accept my inference in this very
general form, I am persuaded that the principles relative to
the future of the state, set by her before the public in the
scientific and systematic fashion which is characteristic of
her volume, ought to influence opinion deeply, not only in
her country but in my own.

Haldane

London, April, 1920