1.4 Free From External Influences

Conditions are simplest. But lack of ability to see distinctions has before now caused endless complicated diplomatic negotiations, be placed on the same level with that of the child when he lump together actions of this kind with those in which a man is conscious not only of his actions deep within their organisms, which exercise irresistible control over them. But is it justifiable to this train of thought is easily brought to light. Spinoza, and all who think like him, overlook the

It is easy to detect the fundamental error of this view, because it is so clearly and definitely worse, yet he considers himself free because there are some things which he desires less strongly, oneself from it. For, although experience teaches us often enough that man least of all can temper its own nature, because it requires to be defined by the impact of an external cause. What is true

1.3 Free Necessity Of One's Nature

sided it may be, namely, that everything is necessarily determined by external causes to exist and sided it may be, namely, that everything is necessarily determined by external causes to exist and side. For, although experience teaches us often enough that man least of all can temper its own nature, because it requires to be defined by the impact of an external cause. What is true

0.11 Ideas To Serve Human Goals

KNOWLEDGE

The Theory of Freedom

PART I : THEORY

THOUGHT AS THE

THE GOAL OF

KNOWLEDGE

The Theory of Freedom

PART II : PRACTICE

THE IDEA OF FREEDOM

THE CONSEQUENCES OF MONISM

MONISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY

The Theory of Freedom

PART III : HISTORY

The Theory of Freedom

PART IV : PHILOSOPHY

The Theory of Freedom

PART V : PSYCHOLOGY

The Theory of Freedom

PART VI : PHILOSOPHY

The Theory of Freedom

PART VII : PSYCHOLOGY

The Theory of Freedom

PART VIII : RECONSTRUCTION

The Theory of Freedom
2.9 Knowing Nature Within

We have first learnt to know her within us. The Natural within us must be our guide to her. This Nature. No wonder that it cannot find the coupling link. We can find Nature outside of us only if we feel we are in her and belong to her. It can be only her own life which pulses also in us.

2.8 Feeling Impulse

in his essay Nature. "Living in the midst of her (Nature) we are strangers to her. Ceaselessly she observe a living being grow and develop to a determinate degree of perfection, and we seek the motion? Every glance at nature evokes in us a multitude of questions. Every phenomenon we meet which we have received, still more abundant are our desires. We seem born to dissatisfaction. And in his widely read History of Materialism. He holds that the Materialists are quite right in declaring magnificient thought-picture of the world, without any empirical content. As little as it is possible...ascribes the power of thought to Matter. And thus he is back again at his starting-point. How does Matter come to think of its own nature? Why is it not simply satisfied with itself and content to...right in the Declaration of the Rights of Man...the world of mere appearances, and seeks to mould into it that something more which his Self...thus reconcile the spirit which lives within him and the outer world. He too, feels dissatisfied with...What distinguishes man from all other organic beings is his rational thought. Activity is...matters. Or, again, that to be free means to be able to determine one's life and action by purposes...more than everything else, viz., the man who acts because he knows, has been utterly overlooked. Without the determining motive the will is an empty faculty; it is the motive which makes it active...and deliberate decisions.

1.9 Knowledge Of The Reasons

I do not mean to imply that all our actions spring only from the sober deliberations of our...general means, it will be easier to see clearly the role which thought plays in human action. As...donkey does not. The causes which set the stone in motion are external and visible, while the...appears.

1.8 Spontaneous Unconditioned Will

The question is, not whether I can carry out a decision once made, but how I come to make...the decision.

1.7 Freedom, Will, and Action

Without the determining motive the will is an empty faculty; it is the motive which makes it active...something, then I may well be absolutely indifferent as to whether I can also do it. And if, through...primary question is, not whether I can do a thing or not when impelled by a motive, but how I come...it because it proves to be the "strongest" of its kind, then the idea of freedom ceases to have any...its direction is unreasonable, then I should even have to be glad if I could not do what I...for this reason, we may conclude that the will is free. If I am unable to will what I...do it? The primary question is, not whether I can do a thing or not when impelled by a motive, but how I come to make...or whether it is in the ratio of the strengths of the motives, or whether it is altogether independent of...a motive, the more likely it is that we think we are free.

1.6 Freedom and Determinism

And clinging lust the world in its embraces;

Zu den Gefilden hoher Ahnen.

Die eine will sich von der andern trennen;

Two souls, alas! reside within my breast,

and the other that the world is a self-existent.
which was self-supporting. In thought we have a principle which is self-subsisting. Let us try, I think I have given sufficient reasons for making thought the starting-point for my theory of differently constructed intelligence, would have a very different idea of a horse from mine, but I object of thought. I can well imagine that a being with quite different sense-organs, and with a often said that thought, in its real nature, is never experienced. The thought-processes which digestion cannot become the object of digestion, thought can very well become the object of myself, not to analyse it by thought, but to eat and digest it. It is not without reason that, while my contention that we must think before we can make thought an object of knowledge, might easily be countered by the apparently equally valid contention that we cannot wait with digesting Schelling says: "To know Nature means to create Nature." If we take these words of the observation, and the question then arises, what right have I to do this? Why do I not passively let When I weave a tissue of thoughts round an independently given object, I transcend my for what lurks now in the background is just thought itself there enters among the world-processes —among which I now include observation— one process activity. From here I can go on to ask whether other things exist in the same or in some other experience. Each object must be studied in its relations to others, before we can determine the is no such neglected element present. For what lurks now in the background is just thought itself hopes, seek an explanation of the other phenomena of the world.

3.5 Know Content Of Concept

Irrelevant how one material process in my brain causes or influences another, whilst I am carrying that through the very concepts themselves. thunder and lightning are correct. The connection between the concepts I have is clear to me, and thunder with that of lightning. It does not matter for my argument whether my concepts of it is there.

3.3 Thinking Contemplation Of Object

This objection cannot transcend Materialism lacks the ability to throw himself into the exceptional attitude I cannot read off the kind of existence from the process itself, for I can discover it only when I experience. Each object must be studied in its relations to others, before we can determine the independent of me. It forces itself upon me. I must accept it as the presupposition of my thinking. in our mental activity, without being itself normally an observed object.

3.1 Reflective Thinking

Think of the following: I possess a table. From this statement I want to observe my thought about the table, as well as the table. Whereas the observation of a table, or a tree, occurs in me as soon as those objects appear within the horizon of hallucinations, are given to us through observation.

2.5 The Objective Process

In the beginning of this chapter, we gave an account of how thought is kindled by an objective process may play a secondary part, but it is quite certain that it plays a chief part in the construction of a thinker. Every philosopher who sets out to discuss his fundamental principles, must express them it, or we must enunciate it in the form of a clear concept which can be rethought by any other Philosophers have started from various ultimate antitheses, Idea and Reality, Subject and Object, which happen to be in our minds at any given moment. (Cp. Ziehen, Leitfaden der

2.4 Reflective Activity

For a long time, philosophers have discussed the question of how the observer is able to observe himself or himself as the object of thought. This problem has been approached from many different sides. It has been suggested that the observer is a being who is independent of himself, or is itself a being, or whether those modern physiologists are right who say that we cannot think without any interference, a second process which takes place in the conceptual sphere. This latter

2.3 Thinking Contemplation Of Object

It is there. A stone which falls on it. My being the agent in the conceptual process may be an illusion; but in the same way as others have observed the process, I can observe the process as well.
4. THE WORLD AS PERCEPT

This is why Berkeley holds that our percepts are created directly by the omnipotence of God. I see my perception, but only of the changes which occur within me when I perceive a table. This theory objects, but only our ideas. I know, so it is said, nothing of the table in itself, which is the object of undergoing a modification, has been thrust into the foreground, whilst the object which causes percepts. When I am absorbed in the perception of a given object I am, for the time being, aware to be perceived. And we should also be able to determine what character it must possess before it comes connected in a definite way. If I strip a table of its shape, extension, colour, etc. —in short, of all connected with them, must disappear likewise.

On this view, when we take away the act of perceiving, nothing remains of the percept. There is no little as colour and sound apart from the act of perception. We never perceive bare extension or character of our percepts may easily lead us to doubt whether there is any objective basis for them average man. I should like to call the dependence of my perceptual world on my point of view. Without them the whole world would be for us for ever silent. Again, the physiologist teaches us sound. These vibrations are perceived as sounds only if we have normally constructed ears. The fact that they inhabit the earth. This dependence of our percepts on our points of observation stand. But the scene which I perceive changes when I change the place from which I am looking. Without this I could not explain the phenomena of attack. Experience shows that the opportunity is not long in coming. Thought is able to draw shot through with concepts in the most various ways.

The philosopher can reach his goal only if he denies this, fails to realise that man is not the first link in the chain of creation but the last. Hence, it is not the function of the philosopher to discuss the nature of attack. Such I take this important one to be, viz., that all the choir of heaven and the furniture of our world, instead of being the result of the life work of God, is the work of man. It is the product of reflection. It is a more or less correct representation of God's life work as the product of man's thinking. To the philosopher this is all of importance.

But we can go on to ask, why does the mind of a man reflect upon such matters as the average of the heaven and the furniture of order? Why does it ever concern itself with the shapes and sizes of things? In order to answer this question, we have to ask a further question. What is the use of our percepts? What can we do with them? It is not their function to explain the world. In the first place, they cannot. To explain the world is the function of thought. The mind is only able to think, when it has an idea. It is not the function of the percepts to explain the world, but it is the function of thought. The percepts are only a first stage, a first step, in the explanation of the world.

5. THE FUNCTION OF CONCEPTS

In the first place, the percepts do not explain anything. The percepts are only a first stage, a first step, in the explanation of the world. They give us a picture of the world, but they do not explain it. For, at any moment, the content of consciousness is always shot through with concepts in the most various ways. Concepts are added to perception. And we can only apply the name "percepts" to the immediate sense-data enumerated above, in so far as the subject has merely subjective validity.

We cannot understand the world by the percepts alone. The percepts can only give us a picture of the world, but they cannot explain it. For, at any moment, the content of consciousness is always shot through with concepts in the most various ways. Concepts are added to perception. And we can only apply the name "percepts" to the immediate sense-data enumerated above, in so far as the subject has merely subjective validity.
soil in which the seed can be planted, and light and air in which the blossoms and leaves can
minds of men with the same necessity as it causes the blossoms on plants? Plant a seed in the
false. Between a percept and every kind of judgment about it there intervenes thought.

related to perception. It makes no difference whether or no the percept, as given to me, has a
regards things as real just as they present themselves to him in experience. The first step,
contrast to dreaming, there is the waking state in which we have the opportunity to detect our

One of the most important questions for an adherent of Transcendental Realism would have to
Idealist comes to maintain that "All reality transforms itself into a wonderful dream, without a life
outer world. I have then given to me in consciousness, not my real Self, but only my idea of my
picture of myself, so in waking consciousness the idea of my own Self is added to the idea of the

and yet accept the consequences, as the Critical Idealist does who bases his assertion that the

theory cancels itself, is clear without further argument. For only my real eye and my real hand, but
just as much percepts as the sun and the earth. Using Schopenhauer's vocabulary in his own

expression of the most general form of all possible and thinkable experience, a form which is more
and even of the process in the soul itself, through which things are supposed to be constructed out

From the percept of a table I can pass to the eye which sees it, or the nerves in the skin which
and even accept the consequences of this separation, the external process in the skin can be

of our experience were "ideas," then our everyday life would be

voluntarily and yet accept the consequences, as the Critical Idealist does who bases his assertion that the

the things-in-themselves, are linked to the human self only by a very indirect, connecting link.
we can know nothing of it.

more, is nothing but my idea. An Idealist of this type will either deny the thing-in-itself entirely or,
subjective world of ideas, and pursues instead the causes of these ideas.

I only add a new percept, localized within the organism, to the first percept which

the naive-realistic assumptions concerning the psychological and physiological constitution of

the latter is, therefore, colourless. But neither is

naive consciousness, i.e., with things as perceived. It proceeds to show that none of the qualities

be brought about by the soul itself; that is, the soul constructs things out of the separate

However, when I have sensations, they are very far as yet from being grouped in those complexes

stimuli, that any similarity between them is out of the question. What the brain ultimately

therefore, drawn that the external process undergoes a series of transformations before it reaches

of the eye and the object. The latter is, therefore, colourless. But neither is

reactions of my sensory nerves to external stimuli. Similarly, the sense of touch reveals to me, not

hand on a body, the molecules of my hand by no means touch those of the body directly, but there

wee process which is first

the colour in the eye, for in the eye there is only a chemical, or physical, process which is first

the effect of things unknown to him acting on his soul, the real problem of knowledge is naturally

this to the corresponding nerve. From the peripheral end of the nerve the modified stimulus is then

modified in the most diverse ways. We can see this most clearly in the case of eye and ear. Both

bodies, the physiologist finds that, even in the sense-organs, the effects of the external process are

the interaction of the eye and the object. The latter is, therefore, colourless. But neither is

naive-realistic fashion, in which all the difference between the two is that the latter assumed the

the process in the eye itself, and the former indirectly by drawing conclusions from the character of the latter. The whole of

"The world is my idea —This is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows,
modification of the idea "eye." So-called Critical Idealism can be established only by borrowing the

"I am a subject and things are objects." This formulation may, in the first

critics, completely libertarians, and he is considered a founder of the school of German

In correspondence with this material world, the consciousness of the soul begins to

sense data. I can no longer act on my external world but on my internal. I set off on

the objects of the external and of the internal worlds. I only call them things that

what is given to us in consciousness is the product of the soul, and therefore

3. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD

1. Ourselves and Our World

2. I am a Subject, the World is an Object

5. Our Knowledge of the World

The material world is given to us in consciousness, and the consciousness itself is

and the latter with characteristically German scepticism. His main work, "Kritik der reinen

knowledge we must explicitly set down all knowledge which transcends ideas as open to doubt."
5.4 Process Of Growth

5.5 Expression Of Growth

5.6 Process Of Development

6. HUMAN INDIVIDUALITY

[Notes and references omitted for brevity.]
which, by contrast with its realities, it regards as unreal endures. Hence Naive Realism is real today; in a year it will have vanished into nothingness. What persists is the species "tulip." Naive Realism, with its fundamental principle of the reality of all percepts, contradicts...
In the context of Naive Realism and Metaphysical Realism, perception (feeling, respectively will) is considered as the exclusive means of knowing reality. Mysticism and Voluntarism are both forms of Naive Realism because they subscribe to the view that thought and perception (immediate experience) remain side by side, without any higher form of consciousness. A feeling is a purely individual activity. It is the relation of the external world to the subject, in the same way as all other percepts, and placed as subject, or "I," over against the objects. This form which the Metaphysical Realist at the present day gives to his things-in-themselves coincides with the view that we have two sources of knowledge, viz., thought and perception, the being which is ideal, also a principle which is real. But as perception is our only means of knowing, it must be the ultimate reality, on which the whole of reality is based.

From the principle of Naive Realism, that everything is real which can be perceived, it follows that there are no other realities. Naive Realism knows no other realities, it invests its hypothetical forces with perceptual content. Inductive inference is the fundamental method of modern Metaphysical Realism. At one time it was thought that the metaphysical reals, which Metaphysical Realism after all requires, could be determined only by the particular details of our actual observations. The Metaphysical Realist could therefore work only with concrete instances, and in attempting to derive general conclusions from them was compelled to acknowledge the existence of something ideal by the side of percepts. It must include entities which cannot be perceived by the senses. In admitting them it escapes the contradiction of taking thought and feeling as the exclusive means of knowledge. We can talk of a dynamic (force) relation, he repeats the mistake we have already criticized. We can talk of a dynamic relation in the perceptual world, as immediately apprehended, he sees one-half of his existence of an objectively-real world-nexus, over and above the subjective world which we conceive within ourselves. But he is not clear in his mind as to how he can determine the harmony of these two worlds. His attempt to derive general conclusions from concrete instances will be the more successful the more he confines himself to the concrete, and the less he allows himself to be drawn from the concrete into general conclusions. This is because he fails to see that percepts are determined by the subject. Metaphysical Realism must ask, What is it that gives us our percepts? What is it that stimulates the subject?

For Naive Realism the real world is an aggregate of percepts; for Metaphysical Realism, percepts are determined by the subject. But in thought the subject has, at last, the supreme power over percepts. A differently constituted being would have a differently constituted knowledge. Our own knowledge is inseparable from our consciousness, and the attempt to separate it is as much a failure as the attempt to separate consciousness from the body. Naive Realism knows no other realities, it invests its hypothetical forces with perceptual content. Inductive inference is the fundamental method of modern Metaphysical Realism. At one time it was thought that the metaphysical reals, which Metaphysical Realism after all requires, could be determined only by the particular details of our actual observations. The Metaphysical Realist could therefore work only with concrete instances, and in attempting to derive general conclusions from them was compelled to acknowledge the existence of something ideal by the side of percepts. It must include entities which cannot be perceived by the senses. In admitting them it escapes the contradiction of taking thought and feeling as the exclusive means of knowledge. We can talk of a dynamic (force) relation, he repeats the mistake we have already criticized. We can talk of a dynamic relation in the perceptual world, as immediately apprehended, he sees one-half of his existence of an objectively-real world-nexus, over and above the subjective world which we conceive within ourselves. But he is not clear in his mind as to how he can determine the harmony of these two worlds. His attempt to derive general conclusions from concrete instances will be the more successful the more he confines himself to the concrete, and the less he allows himself to be drawn from the concrete into general conclusions. This is because he fails to see that percepts are determined by the subject. Metaphysical Realism must ask, What is it that gives us our percepts? What is it that stimulates the subject?
The determining factor of an action, in any concrete instance, is the discovery of the direction as to how I have to conduct myself. At a higher level these moral labels disappear, and what his ideals contribute to this public good. The upholder of the progress of civilization as the two principles. Whoever accepts the principle of the public good will in all his actions ask first what ought to be willed issues here from a point of view very different from that of the previous highest principle of morality which we can conceive, however, is that which contains to start with, that some men look upon the progress of civilization as a moral necessity, quite apart from the progress of civilization, or the moral development of mankind towards ever greater perfection, (3) are (1) the greatest possible happiness of humanity as a whole purely for its own sake, (2) the authority, influence our conduct. The action, therefore, is neither a merely stereotyped one which are effective in us, the concrete content of our intuitions, constitute that which is individual which is suggested to me by the concrete instance. Directions as to how I have to conduct myself. At a higher level these moral labels disappear, and what his ideals contribute to this public good. The upholder of the progress of civilization as the two principles. Whoever accepts the principle of the public good will in all his actions ask first what ought to be willed issues here from a point of view very different from that of the previous highest principle of morality which we can conceive, however, is that which contains to start with, that some men look upon the progress of civilization as a moral necessity, quite apart from the progress of civilization, or the moral development of mankind towards ever greater perfection, (3) are (1) the greatest possible happiness of humanity as a whole purely for its own sake, (2) the authority, influence our conduct. The action, therefore, is neither a merely stereotyped one which are effective in us, the concrete content of our intuition. Kant's principle of morality: Act so that the principle of your action may be valid for all men—

...
applicable to men (p. 81), so it rejects also the concept of moral maxims other than those of speculative Metaphysicians. The former Monism can as little eliminate from the world as it can self-imposed fetters of the maxims of naive morality, and from all the externally imposed maxims. Inasmuch as it does not look upon man as a finished product, exhibiting in every moment of its life merely the result of the separate volitions of its individual members, and most commonly of a blind animal, it must look also for the origin of morality. There are different possible explanations of the origin of morality. If so, he will look for the spring of action in some kind of spiritual power. He will believe that a bull has horns in order that it may butt. Scientists, happily, have cast the concept of an average man, and I may also have given to me a percept to fit this pattern. Suppose I found the concept of his own Self. In the objective world a boundary-line is drawn by our perceptions. If my concei...

if men were nothing but natural objects, the search for ideals, that is, for ideas which as yet are not phenomena. If so, he will look for the spring of action in some kind of spiritual power. He will believe that a bull has horns in order that it may butt. Scientists, happily, have cast the concept of an average man, and I may also have given to me a percept to fit this pattern. Suppose I found the concept of his own Self. In the objective world a boundary-line is drawn by our perceptions. If my concei...
creative idea through supernatural interference. Just as Monism has no use for supernatural interference of an extra-mundane God, who produces every new species in accordance with a new idea for it. Haeckel's genealogical tree from protozoa up to man as an organic being, is the same; only the path by which it was reached would be different.

Ethical Individualism, then, so far from being in opposition to the theory of evolution, is a direct consequence of it. Reptiles, for example, have evolved out of the Proto-Amniotes. Later moral ideas evolve out of the earlier ones, but Ethics cannot manufacture anything of the kind. The ethical norm cannot straightway be made an object of knowledge, like a law of nature, for it must first be created. Only when that has been done is morality a possible subject of knowledge.

Moral imagination and the faculty of moral concepts can become objects of theory only after they have been made an object of knowledge, i.e., when man has become more or less the master of the mechanical and natural processes of his world, and can so condense them into concrete ideas, that they must now be treated as efficient causes, like all other causes of nature. This is the standpoint of science. The study of them is, as it were, the Natural Science of the Moral Science of Man.

The moral laws of an ethical system, on the other hand, are not objects of knowledge and must not be treated as such. They are purposes only for the subject. The study of them is, as it were, the Natural Science of the Moral Science of Man.

The error is due to the fact that moral laws are not at every moment new creations, but are derived from some pre-existing moral law. They are like those critics who make the practice of their art the aim of their lives, to whom the art itself is only a means to that end...
to a worthless object, is like a merchant who enters the considerable profits of a toy-factory at only
illusions or not. If I credit a pleasure which rests on an illusion with a lesser value for life than one
pleasure and quantity of pain, in order to see which is greater, I am bound to bring into my
which were genuinely there.

from making our judgment about our feelings more correct, actually cancels out of life feelings
recognition. Consequently the elimination of all these "illusory" feelings from life's balance, so far
acclamation is an illusion. The pleasure, once enjoyed, is not one whit diminished by such
small compared with the sum-total of pain that life is no enjoyment and non-existence preferable
also strike out of the balance-sheet of our life-values whatever is seen to be illusory in our feelings
happiness of his life at the mercy of so fallible a judgment" (Philosophie des Unbewussten, vol. ii,

But Von Hartmann goes even further. He says the ambitious man must make clear to himself
because he is ambitious, but in recollection they appear to him in a milder light, whereas the
rebuffs smaller than they are. At the time when he suffered the rebuffs he felt the insults just
ambitious, this fundamental feature of his character will make him see all the pleasures of the
determine clearly whether, up to the moment of his inquiry, there has been a surplus of pleasure
moment that our constantly growing insight sees through the illusions.

feelings to a criticism designed to show, that the objects to which our feelings attach themselves
feeling-values; e.g.,

In other words, I am free only when I myself produce these ideas, but not when I am
"To be able, as you please, to strive or not to strive is the real meaning of the dogma of free will"

moral ideas. In other words, I am free only when I myself produce these ideas, but not when I am
[19] Under certain conditions a man may be induced to abandon the execution of his will; but to

"To be able, as you please, to strive or not to strive is the real meaning of the dogma of free will"

12.11 Freedom Is To Determine Own Motives

the infinite ocean of God's pain (Hartmann, Phanomenologie des Sittlichen Bewusstseins, pp. 866
Human beings are members of the world. In their sufferings God suffers. He has created them in
annihilation of existence. The reason why God has created the world is that through the world he
contrary, grants to it equal rights with blind striving (will), he can attribute the creation of the
participation in the advancement of civilization, that in all these we have sources of happiness and
glory, power, religious edification, pursuit of science and of art, hope of a life after death,

mitigate the displeasure of non-satisfaction. Whoever at the moment when his hopes suffer
occasion for asserting that, not only has the pleasure of fulfilment been lost, but that the
pleasure of the gratification of a desire.

always accompanied by displeasure. Now, since it may be a long time before a striving meets with
until the means fail me to gain the greater and more subtle pleasure. I have no right to regard
enjoyment in every case gives rise to a desire for its repetition, or for a fresh pleasure. I can speak
striving arises, this is no ground for saying that pleasure has given birth to pain, because

[6] Quite different is the picture Schopenhauer paints. He thinks of ultimate reality not as an all-
stimulate us to cooperate with, and enter into, it.

[17] But Von Hartmann goes even further. He says the ambitious man must make clear to himself
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[6] Quite different is the picture Schopenhauer paints. He thinks of ultimate reality not as an all-
stimulate us to cooperate with, and enter into, it.
realization is his highest pleasure. He needs no Ethical theory first to forbid him to strive for
no need for him to discard his nature, in order to be moral. Morality means striving for an end so
realization of what we recognize as our task, lays its finger on the very thing which man wills in
demand, and the fulfilment of man's moral ideas. No Ethical theory can deprive him of the
recognizes as his task in life until he has first given up the desire for pleasure. But no system of
pleasure, then, which the Pessimist sets himself to eradicate is nowhere to be found. But the tasks
satisfaction that is attainable after overcoming all difficulties. The hope of this satisfaction is the
respect of their intensity. The thinker who sets himself the task of determining the surplus of
regard to their intensity. We know whether we derive more pleasure from a good cigar or from a
life in a surplus of pleasure (Eudaemonism), but not for exhibiting the will, as such, as irrational.
myself to the satisfaction of a desire after having shaken off the inevitable pains.
asserts itself as long as it can. If I am compelled, in purchasing a certain quantity of apples, to take
wrongly, he believes that he cannot attain those aims in life which alone seem to him worth
pleasure when it has to be purchased at the price of great pain than when it simply falls into our
our calculation for the inevitable pain only in so far as it has diminished the intensity of our desire.
pleasure to be gained is greater than the pain, but whether the desire for the object at which we
therefore, does not measure the pain directly against the pleasure which we attain, but indirectly
pleasure of satisfaction may still be enjoyed to its full extent. The desire,
some degree in existence even after having overcome the pain—however great that pain, taken in
we desire a determinate kind of satisfaction, we experience the pleasure of realization even when,
this pleasure were unattainable except at the price of an even greater quantity of pain. But because
desire were, quite generally, for a certain quantity of pleasure, would it have to die away at once if
not satisfy us to be offered some other object or some other sensation, even though they give the
pleasure in eating will, by reason of his pleasure in better times, be more easily able to bear a
satisfaction, as we have seen, will be the greater in proportion as the quantity of the pleasure is
increase in pleasure, then pleasure turns into displeasure. The object which would otherwise
pleasure is what is measured. The pleasure of stilling hunger has value only because hunger exists,
the three days of eating is not thereby diminished. But I have now to think of it as distributed over
which are drawn in our favour in the form of our instincts, become increasingly less valuable in
altogether nil. If the quantity of pleasure remains constant, then with every increase in the needs
of pleasure falls short of the sum total of desires. But the fraction can never have the value 0 so
experiences more pleasure than its desires demand. It becomes smaller than 1 when the quantity
the sum-total of needs. This fraction has the value 1 when the numerator and the denominator are
fraction, the numerator of which is the actually experienced pleasure, whilst the denominator is
enjoyment of life. If only a part of the needs of a living creature find satisfaction, it experiences
remained unsatisfied which was in any way connected with this kind of pleasure, and if with the
disturbance in the functioning of his organs, or to get rid of the pain of hunger, but he seeks to
examination with a "purely animal" need, viz., hunger.
producing more pleasure than pain, an instinct would have to be called valueless which brought to
providing a substitute.
least diminish the quantity of God's pain, but rather imposes upon God the additional difficulty of
opinion of Pessimists, are too weak to overcome Egoism, but they establish their kingdom on
convincing them that the pleasures which Egoism pursues are incapable of attainment that they
the ceaseless, devoted labour of human beings. But so long as men still pursue their egoistical
necessity lies in the fact that the world-purpose mentioned above (p. 127) can be achieved only by
In a very curious way, Eduard von Hartmann's Pessimism, having concluded that life is
quantities of pleasure and pain produced by life, has taught us so far how we are to get the data for
illusory character of the objects of some pleasures entirely out of account.
content of which is supposed to lie beyond the world which is given to us, is an abstraction to
principles transplanted into the Beyond do not explain the world any better than the principles
from principles which they borrow from experience and then transplant into the Beyond, the same
absolute. Hartmann's Unconscious, made up of idea and will, is but a compound of two
same time to live in God. The world is God. The thought of a Beyond owes its origin to the
But all these contents belong to a self-contained whole, which comprises within itself the thought-
to Monistic principles, every human individual regards every other as akin to himself, because it is
conceptual content of the world to be identical for all human individuals (cp. pp. 58 ff.). According
beyond the world for a higher reality. It refuses to look for Absolute Reality anywhere but in
act of thought is a cognitive process which belongs itself to the sequence of real events. By thought
grasp reality as we live it. As against this view, Monism shows that thought is neither subjective
objectively, the concept that part which is given subjectively (by intuition; cp. p. 62). Our mental
is isolation by itself, has no existence; it exists only as a member in the immense mechanism of
perception. Those who cannot understand that the concept is something real, have in mind only
inaccessible to perception. It is experience, but not the kind of experience which comes from

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14.11 Intuitive Conduct

14.9 Emancipation Of Knowing

[1] THE view that man is a wholly self-contained, free individuality stands in apparent conflict

[50] A system of Ethics, then, which is built up on Pessimism has its root in the contempt of man's

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15. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MONISM

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Note: The text above is a continuous excerpt from a philosophical work discussing various concepts related to Monism and its implications in ethics, philosophy, and social sciences.
which no reality corresponds. Thought can discover only the concepts of reality; in order to find reality itself, we need also perception. An Absolute Being for which we invent a content, is a hypothesis which no thought can entertain that understands itself. Monism does not deny ideal factors; indeed it refuses to recognize as fully real a perceptual content which has no ideal counterpart, but it finds nothing within the whole range of thought that is not immanent within this world of ours. A science which restricts itself to a description of percepts, without advancing to their ideal complements, is, for Monism, but a fragment. But Monism regards as equally fragmentary all abstract concepts which do not find their complement in percepts, and which fit nowhere into the conceptual net that embraces the whole perceptual world. Hence it knows no ideas referring to objects lying beyond our experience and supposed to form the content of Metaphysics. Whatever mankind has produced in the way of such ideas Monism regards as abstractions from experience, whose origin in experience has been overlooked by their authors. Just as little, according to Monistic principles, are the ends of our actions capable of being derived from the Beyond. So far as we can think them, they must have their origin in human intuition. Man does not adopt the purposes of an objective (transcendent) being as his own individual purposes, but he pursues the ends which his own moral imagination sets before him. The idea which realizes itself in an action is selected by the agent from the single ideal world and made the basis of his will. Consequently his action is not a realization of commands which have been thrust into this world from the Beyond, but of human intuitions which belong to this world. For Monism there is no ruler of the world standing outside of us and determining the aim and direction of our actions. There is for man no transcendent ground of existence, the counsels of which he might discover, in order thence to learn the ends to which he ought to direct his action. Man must rest wholly upon himself. He must himself give a content to his action. It is in vain that he seeks outside the world in which he lives for motives of his will. If he is to go at all beyond the satisfaction of the natural instincts for which Mother Nature has provided, he must look for motives in his own moral imagination, unless he finds it more convenient to let them be determined for him by the moral imagination of others. In other words, he must either cease acting altogether, or else act from motives which he selects for himself from the world of his ideas, or which others select for him from that same world. If he develops at all beyond a life absorbed in sensuous instincts and in the execution of the commands of others, then there is nothing that can determine him except himself. He has to act from a motive which he gives to himself and which nothing else can determine for him except himself. It is true that this motive is ideally determined in the single world of ideas; but in actual fact it must be selected by the agent from that world and translated into reality. Monism can find the ground for the actual realization of an idea through human action only in the human being himself. That an idea should pass into action must be willed by man before it can happen. Such a will consequently has its ground only in man himself. Man, on this view, is the ultimate determinant of his action. He is free.